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SPEEDING UP JUSTICE

In this issue will be found the report of the committee
appointed to recommend changes in our present legal procedure with a view to eliminating needless delay before a
litigant gets that for which he came into Court, whether or
not the result is exactly what he desired.
Procrastination as a thief of time never fulfilled its role
more completely than under our present system where a skillful practitioner on the "slow" side of a lawsuit can prevent
trial of a case unconscionably. It is safe to assume that 99%
of the lawsuits are brought because the plaintiff could not get
his just dues from his fellow man, yet unnecessary delay as
now "practiced" frequently results in loss of evidence, or removal of witnesses, change in plaintiff's financial condition, or
deterioration or destruction of property which is the subject
of the litigation, and the net result is a miscarriage of justice.
There is no possible way of estimating the money loss caused
by needlessly stringing along a lawsuit, but every lawyer
knows that over a period of years it must be trenmendous.
The single calendar system would arrange for a presiding
judge from one division to hear motions and demurrers in all
cases. The other four divisions would do nothing except try
cases. The issues being joined before the presiding judge, the
case would be sent to a trial division in the same manner as at
present. There would thus be five motion days each week,
excluding Saturday, and with other recommended changes,
such as filing motions and demurrers simultaneously, and the
act of filing constituting an automatic setting of the same for
disposition.
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On December 30th last, Guy A. Thompson of St. Louis,
President of the American Bar Association, at a meeting in
Omaha of the Nebraska Bar Association, solemnly warned his
audience that in the interests of speedy justice instead of legal
delay the lawyers must reorganize the judicial system, before
an exasperated public does it for them.
Recently our Supreme Court "in order that it may
expedite its work," provided for three departments instead of
two, returning to a system used up to a few years ago.
There have been suggestions of a second division of the
United States District Court in Colorado, where a single judge
is struggling against an ever increasing number of unfinished
cases.
With a beautiful new court house nearing completion we
could not do better than to bring into its clean and wholesome
interior a revised legal system more in keeping with the duty
owing to clients and with the theory of the equal administration of justice to all.

SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

Dicta subscribers will doubtless notice the large number
of Supreme Court decisions which appear in this issue, and
which bring the printing of the decisions up to date. It will
be the effort of the editorial staff to hereafter keep the decisions up to the minute.

JUDGE WILLIAM

A. HILL

Judge William A. Hill, former justice of the Colorado
Supreme Court died in Santa Monica, California, Wednesday,
March 9, 1932.
He was born in Illinois, moved to Fort Morgan as a
young man, then came to Denver and resided here many years.
He was a state senator from Fort Morgan, mayor of Fort
Morgan, attorney of Morgan county, and secretary of the
Fort Morgan schools.

ACCEPTANCE OF AN OFFER FOR A
UNILATERAL CONTRACT
(ACCEPTANCE

BY OVERT

AcT)-A Comment upon

the Restatement
Stanley H. Johnson, Judge of the Juvenile Court
6 TTNILATERAL contract" is a misleading expression,
owinj to its literal implication that a contract may
be one sided. Supposedly, it is a fundamental premise that gratuitous promises are not enforceable, in spite of
the unfortunate rule which has arisen in recent years allowing
an action upon promises to contribute to building funds for
charitable purposes, not supported by any apparent consideration. Young Men's Christian Association vs. Estill, 140 Ga.
291. Of course, it is still possible to excite an argument in a
layman, or an embryonic student, by a flat statement that such
is the law, but the eager answer is based upon feelings of policy no longer open to one whose mind has been attuned to the
habit of legal thought. It does not signify in what manner I
express my careless gift of words, so long as I do not mislead
a reasonable promisee into the belief that my words import
a consideration: whether I say, "I will give you $1,000 toward
a European trip," or "I promise to pay you $1,000, if you will
go to Europe," providing that you reasonably understand it
is nothing to me whether you go on a pleasure trip, or continue
to starve at your professional labors.
The recipient of such an offer may ruin himself in reliance upon it without redress in court. This was-the case of
the widow Kirksey (8 Ala. 131), who gave up her homestead
at the request of her open-handed, but short tempered, brotherin-law. The weakness of her case did not lie in the failure of
the parties' minds to meet, as the court put it in the discredited
case of Cooke vs. Oxley, K. B. 1790, 3 Term Rep. 653, and in
scores of American cases still in full credit, but rather because
her brother-in-law's promise to provide a home for her upon
his property would not have indicated to the illusive reason-

U

No'rE: All of the cases cited herein may be found in Corbin's Cases on Contracts,
and most of them in W'lNiston's casebook.
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able person that her surrendering her homestead and moving
to his premises was any consideration to him.
Such promises as this in an earlier day were described as
"unilateral" or picturesquely as "mere naked promises", using
either expression in the sense to indicate that there was no
quid pro quo. High Wheel Auto Parts Co. vs. Journal Co.,
50 Ind. App. 396, 98 N. E. 442. But, largely perhaps, through
the influence of Professor Williston, the expression "unilateral,
in spite of the literal inaccuracy, means today that the promise
contained in the offer is to be accepted, and a contract entered
into, by means of an act, as distinguished from a verbal promise. In place of unilateral, therefore, one should picture a
contract with a promise on one side only, upon the other side
an act.
Courts of common law are no more firmly wedded to the
proposition that gratuitous promises are unenforceable than
they are to the rule that in enforcing contracts, they are merely
giving binding effect to the apparent intent of the parties, as
in the "Peerless" case. I Williston No. 73. We find this
expressed very positively in the Restatement of the Law of
Contracts by The American Law Institute, Secs. 3, 19b, 20,
25, 52, and 55. It is a platitude that an offeror, so long as he
makes his meaning clear, may make as ridiculous or unlikely
an offer as he pleases, one, in fact, which cannot be accepted.
And it has always been acknowledged, generally speaking,
that to create a contract, the offeree must accept the offer according to its terms, or, as the Restatement puts it in Sec. 59,
"(Except as this rule is qualified by Sections 45, 63, 72), an
acceptance must comply exactly with the requirements of the
offer, omitting nothing from the promise or performance requested. (The parentheses are mine). Sec. 63 excepts instances where the offer calls for a promise from the offeree,
but where the latter does or tenders the act which he should
have promised, within the specified time. This exception will
be pardoned by most for its departure from the general rule,
upon the ground that the offeror is getting something better
than he called for,-not merely a promise, but the act called
for in the promise. This variance from the offeror's intent,
due to the usual "practical policy", demands your close scrutiny. At least, the circumstances surrounding performance
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should be such as to indicate a clear intention upon the part
of the offeree to accept the offer. White vs. Corlies, 46 N. Y.
467. Section 72 excepts the much discussed acceptances by silence and inaction. It is, however, Sec; 45 which gaves rise
to this article.
That section conceals in its sweeping declaration a compromise to lawyers upon a very muddled legal problem. It
states: "If an offer for a unilateral contract is made, and part
of the consideration requested in the offer is given or tendered
by the offeree in response thereto, the offeror is bound by a

contract, the duty of immediate performance of which is conditional on the full consideration being given or tendered
within the time stated in the offer, or, if no time is stated therein, within a reasonable time."
The theme of this article is that this statement is not a
statement of the law, that it is opposed to the fundamental
rules upon the formation of contracts, and further, that its
language is contradictory. It is surprising to find Professor
Williston drawn into such a declaration, after one has heard
and read his attacks upon judicial efforts to compromise the
problem. I Williston No. 60, 60A, 68, and 73. These compromises will be mentioned later.
One objection to Sec. 45 is the attempt to cover all the
diversified types of unilateral contracts by one blanket rule,
although it is apparent that there are several different kinds
of contracts of this character. But the chief defect lies in
the two phrases: "part of the consideration requested" and
"the offeror is bound by a contract." The first phrase is objectionable because it fails to recognize that ordinarily the consideration for an offer looking toward a unilateral contract
is the completed act requested, and that preliminary steps
toward the fulfillment of the act are not divisible parts.
The second phrase "is more seriously defective, in my opinion,
because it holds the offeror bound to the unilateral contract,
which, however, has no binding effect upon the offeree,-a
legal anomaly. There is no dispute, of course, over the proposition that offers for such contracts are made, and the act of
acceptance begun, under such circumstances that it is the apparent intention of both that neither may withdraw. But in
such instances the contract by which both parties are bound is
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not the major unilateral contract, but a preliminary bi-lateral
contract to enter into a unilateral contract,-in other words,
a double option, not verbally expressed, but necessarily implied from the acts of the parties and the surrounding circumstances. But this is not to say that all offers for unilateral
contracts are of this nature.
This distinction is more easily demonstrated by examples:
1. A offers the public (B) $500 for information leading
to the arrest and conviction of C for murder.
2. A offers B $500 to plough A's field.
3. A offers B $500 to evolve a chemical formula of use
in A's business.
4. A offers B $500 to install adequate hot water plumbing in A's house.
5. A offers to provide B with room and board and to
devise his house to B on his death, if B will come to live with
A and take care of A until his death.
The intention in the language of the Restatement seems
to be that any preliminary act of the offeree toward acceptance will bind the offeree to a contract. Yet, clearly, the first
example is of the kind in which no preliminary act of the
offeree will bind A at all. The meaning of A's offer is clearly
full performance, and nothing less. Shuey vs. U. S., 92 U. S.
73. Although I believe that in none of these examples is the
consideration divisible, it is possible to find in the second and
fifth examples a certain value to A in part performance. In
the third and fourth examples, there clearly is none, although
in both there will be injury to either party, if the other withdraw. It is worth noting, at this point, however, that the
promisee of a gratuitous offer may also be greatly injured,
and further, that in any of the above examples the circumstances may disclose an apparent intention upon the part of-A
not to be bound to anything until full performance is given,
or, on the other hand, that both shall be bound as soon as work
is commenced. It is improbable that A should intend in the
ordinary contract to be bound by preliminary acts of B without a corresponding duty on B's part not to withdraw, although it must be admitted such a situation might exist.
One naturally seeks authority for the startling statement
in Sec. 45, in view of the fact that A has not received what he
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bargained for. One wonders further whether there has not
been created a unilateral contract in the old sense. The Institute assumes, in the face of A's express demand for full performance, that A asks for two things: beginning performance
and completing performance. Partial consideration may be
regarded as a legal paradox, except in cases where it is the
unmistakable intention of both parties that B's beginning performance shall bind A to an option. I Williston No. 102, 115.
Reverting for the moment to Sec. 63, we find the offeree
protected for reasons of policy where B has given, not the
promise of A asked for, but the act to be promised. It appears that in the eyes of the law the accomplished fact is as
good as, if not better than, the potential fact contained in the
promise. B's word may be good but his act is better. In Sec.
45, however, it pleases the Institute to disregard policy, for
here, where A has distinctly demanded the accomplished fact,
we find that he is given only the most infinitesimal part of that
fact, and not even the word of B upon which to sue. It may
be said that if A is asking, for his own protection, the act from
B, instead of B's mere promise, he should have it. Or else
it may be said that in giving rights of action upon contract, we
are tending to disregard the express intention of the parties
and affirming by rule, arbitrarily what A may have and what
he may not.
Examples of judicial paternalism are frequent. Courts
are prone to protect, at least in fairly well defined fields, the
foolish contractor from his folly. Witness the strange Massachusetts rule for builders who have made a bad bargain, now
firmly established in Munroe vs. Perkins, 9 Pick. 298, 20 Am.
Dec. 475. But the Institute in Sec. 45 would wipe out the
elemental rule in all cases of unilateral contract.
It is easy to find the reason for the adoption of this section
in many of the decided cases. Unilateral contracts, if the clemental rule is to be enforced, are hard cases, frequently, from
the offeree's point of view, and like other "hard cases", have
given rise to "bad law". Instances are given in Williston's
treatise of the effort courts have made to protect the offeree
by the following false conclusions:
1. By promissory estoppel, a dangerous fiction; estoppel
is predicated upon a misstatement of fact, but even if A's

DICTA

promise is regarded as a fact, wherein is the misrepresentation?
2. By implying in A's offer a request for acceptance by
promise, rather than by act, and by implying in B's first efforts
the promise supposed to be called for-a double fiction.
3. That part performance, as stated in the Restatement,
is consideration, or in other words by the bald statement that
the offeree has performed, when in fact, he has riot.
Such decisions justify the conventional statue of Justice
blindfolded, so irritating to the conscientious lawyer. One
example of such a ruling is sufficient. In Brackenbury vs.
Hodgkin, 116 Me. 399, 102 Atl. 106 (1917) A, an old lady
owning a farm in Maine, wrote to her married daughter, living in Missouri, that if the latter would move to Maine and
take care of her till her death, the daughter paying the moving
expenses, she would allow the daughter the use and income
of the property and leave her the farm upon the mother's
death. After the daughter had gone to the trouble and expense
of moving and had lived with her mother a few weeks, trouble
developed between them, and the daughter was asked to move.
The mother then conveyed the property to her son. The action was really a proceeding in equity for reconveyance to the
mother, and an injunction, but is of course decided upon principles of contract.
One readily sees the injustice if the mother is allowed to
prevail. Truly, a "hard case." But it is dealt with summarily
in a terse opinion. The court is clear as to the nature of the
contract:
"The offer was the basis, not of a bilateral contract, requiring a reciprocal promise, a promise for a promise, but of
a unilateral contract, requiring an act for a promise. In other
words the promise becomes binding when the act is performed."
Then follows immediately the curious conclusion that,
"The plaintiffs here accepted the offer by moving from Missouri to the mother's farm in Lewiston and entering upon the
performance of the specified acts, and they have continued
performance since that time so far as they have been permitted by the mother to do so. The existence of a completed
and valid contract is clear."

DICTA

There is no denial that some remedy should be given the
plaintiff; it is submitted that an action for the reasonable value
of the services would include every act of the plaintiff. But
the court, although it states that a complete contract exists,
would surely have hesitated to give the mother damages for
breach had the daughter and her husband voluntarily moved
out and returned to Missouri. Like Sec. 45 of the restatement, the court in effect implies a promise by the offeror not
to revoke, in consideration of the offeree's trouble in getting
under weigh.
In this and other similar cases the court's heart is with
the offeree. But, in fact, if policy is to be considered, the
offeror's position is not to be ignored. He asks for and wants
full performance. Contracts should be free expressions of
intent. The offeree, if we forget the habitual and dismal
ignorance of contractors, may always counter-offer a demand
for a written bi-lateral contract, a much simpler thing for
the court to construe, unless it is the apparent intention of both
parties that neither shall withdraw until full completion of
the contract, or unless there is a clear intention that the preliminary acts of the offeree shall bind the offeror to an option,
it should be held that the offeror is not bound to perform his
promise, until the offeree has performed in full. I Williston
No. 60, 60A.
It seems that advancing paternalism in judicial decision
does not give that certainty to business which the law of contracts, within the necessary limitations of thought and language, should give. It will be frequently found that the desire
to "give justice" to one, may result in patent injustice to the
other. The following quotation from an article-by Sir Frederick Pollock is unlawyerlike, and far more irrational than
the language of Professor Ashley which he criticizes:
"One or two seem to us really paradoxical, as where he
(Ashley) maintains that in a unilateral contract, where a
promise is offered for an act requiring an appreciable time
for performance, there is no consideration for the promise
until the act is completed. If this be so, the promisor may
withdraw his offer when the work is all but done, or the promisee may capriciously leave the work half done, and in either
case without remedy, unless there be something in the circum-
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stances which can be made to support an action of tort. Both
the plain man and the average lawyer will say that whatever
Professor Ashley's logic may be, the law cannot really be as
absurd as that; and they will be right, and what is more, any
rational court before whom such a question is moved will
surely find a way to make them so."
I have already stated in the opening paragraph, as a matter of my experience, that the "plain" man, dnd at least the
embryonic lawyer will make the same statement regarding
the law's absurdity in connection with the common law rule
that gratuitous promises are unenforceable, but I think that
is no reason for a court to manufacture its own law to take
care of the plain man's complaint. If courts are to be turned
to the layman's view by the layman's complaint, then there
is an end of the common law with its labyrinth of rules produced through centuries of painful thought and experience.
At least, I should not care to designate Pollock's imaginary
court as rational, but should incline to borrow Professor
Manly Hudson's expression, that it was stimulated by a visceral sensation.

LOST, STRAYED OR
Judge Denison cannot find his 72 Colorado.
has better luck kindly notify the Judge.

If any one

Justice, as a moral habit, is that tendency of the will and mode of conduct which refrains from disturbing the lives and interests of others, and, as
far as possible, hinders such interference on the part of others. This virtue
springs from the individual's respect for his fellows as ends in themselves and
as his co-equals. The different spheres of interests may be roughly classified
as follows: body and life; the family, or the extended individual life;
property, or the totality of the instruments of action; honor, or the ideal
existence; and finally freedom, or the possibility of fashioning one's life as an
end in itself. The law defends these different spheres, thus giving rise to a
corresponding number of spheres of rights, each being protected by a prohibition. . . . To violate the rights, to interfere with the interests of the
neighbor; it is an open avowal that the latter is not an end in itself, having
the same value as the individual's own life. The general formula of the duty
of justice may therefore be stated as follows: Do no wrong yourself, and
permit no wrong to be done, so far as lies in your power; or, expressed positively: Respect and protect the right.-Paulsen.

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ELIMINATION OF UNNECESSARY DELAY IN PROCEDURE

y

OUR committee appointed to make recommendations
for the elimination of unnecessary delay in procedure,
recommends that the rules of the District Court of the
Second Judicial District of the State of Colorado be amended
in the following particulars:
I.
All motions and demurrers to any complaint shall be filed at one time
and within the period now allowed for answer under the code after service
of the summons and/or complaint.
All motions and demurrers to any answer or replication (as the case
may be) shall be filed at one and the same time, within such period as may be
fixed for filing of the same.
(Your committee believes that needless delay in civil trials results from
the filing of successive motions and demurrers, seldom presenting vital questions but each requiring separate disposition. The present recommendations
recognize this evil and would require all motions and demurrers to be filed
together. It will frequently be found that both the motions and demurrers
are without merit, and where this is true, both can be disposed of at the same
time. If the motions are not good, but the demurrer is good, that can likewise be determined at one hearing. If the motions are good, no confusion
will arise from having the demurrer filed therewith, for if the motion is sustained, a ruling on the demurrer will be unnecessary; the unsuccessful party
will either stand on his pleadings or plead over; and if he pleads over, the
amended pleading will be in turn subject to a demurrer which will be disposed of at a subsequent hearing).
II.
All motions, demurrers, and proceedings of every kind arising prior to
the trial of the issues shall be receipted for by the opposing counsel or served
upon him and, upon filing of the same, together with the receipt therefor or
affidavit of service, the same shall without further notice be placed upon the
calendar of hearings by the Clerk of the Court upon the following Monday
thereafter, or, if the Presiding Judge system be adopted then three days after
day of receipt of service of notice, in either case, subject to the right of the
Court to grant continuances upon good cause shown as hereinafter provided
in this report.
(The Committee believes that the only reason for filing motions or
demurrers should be a desire to obtain a clear-cut issue and that such issue
should be arrived at as speedily as possible).

DICTA
III.
Continuances of hearings on motions, demurrers and other preliminary
matters (unless by written stipulations of the attorneys) shall not be granted
except upon a strict showing of necessity and proper legal grounds therefor.
(This adds nothing to the present law, as we understand it, but your
committee believes that continuances in preliminary matters have nevertheless come to be asked for and granted for insufficient reasons. We believe
that the Bar as a whole will in the long run profit by the speedy settlement
of all litigation, and that emphasis, by rule of Court, upon the necessity therefor will be helpful).
IV.
After a ruling upon any motions or demurrers, to any pleading, the
party against whom said ruling was made shall be required to plead further
within ten days thereafter, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.
(This amendment will accelerate proceedings and will work no hardship since it will be known in advance that after the motions have been disposed of, further pleadings must promptly follow).
V.
(a) That the division of Court presided over by the Presiding Judge
shall hear and dispose of all preliminary, emergency, and ex parte matters, all
motions and demurrers, and all other proceedings prior to the trial of the issues.
(b) That the remaining divisions shall be trial divisions, and shall
try the issues in all actions and proceedings.
(c) That when any action or proceeding is at issue it may, upon due
notice, be set for trial to the Court, or, if the action be one in which the issues
may be tried to a jury, and a jury be demanded by either party, to a jury.
Such notice with proof of due service shall be filed with the Clerk, who shall,
on the next following court day, present such notice, together with all similar
notices then filed, to the Presiding Judge, who shall, by lot, or by some other
automatic means, and in such a manner as to equalize so far as possible the
work of the various divisions, assign to the trial divisions all such- actions or
proceedings at issue, and all further proceedings in such actions or proceedings
shall be had in the division to which they are so assigned. Motions for new
trials and other matters incidental or subsequent to the trial of the issues
shall be disposed of on Saturdays.
(This amendment constitutes a radical departure from the system now
in use, and substitutes one, which, we are informed, is used in other large
centers with variations. This system, by an article published in "The Denver
Bar Association Record" of January, 1925, was advocated in Denver by
Hudson Moore, and formerly by a committee of which Albert T. Vogl was
a member, who gave the subject extensive study and investigation. It has
more recently been advocated in su.bstantially the above form by Mr. Carle
Whitehead, a member of this committee, whose article in the January 1932
issue of "Dicta" clearly presents its merits and advantages. Major J. B.
Goodman, Chief Deputy Clerk of the Civil Divisions, has furthermore,
advocated this system as a more efficient one. The adoption of the same having
thus been already ably advocated, little beyond a short resume of our own
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reason for recommending it is here necessary, reference being made to the
foregoing articles for a fuller exposition of its advantages and method of
operation.
We believe, first, that by having all motions passed on by a single Judge,
greater uniformity in rulings on questions of pleading may be expected;
second, that by having four judges constantly engaged solely in trying cases,
greater facility in trial practice will necessarily follow; and third, that litigants
and the community generally will benefit by the greater speed with which the
entire legal procedure will operate under this plan. Since the preliminary
matters simply make the issues, we do not believe that the hearing of arguments thereon would be of sufficient value to the trial court to counterbalance the other obvious advantages of the single calendar system.)
Your Committee are agreed that these changes in the rules of court will
help to eliminate delay without injustice to any litigant.
Respectfully submitted,
KENNETH ROBINSON
CARLE WHITEHEAD
BENTLEY MCMULLIN

Louis A. HELLERSTEIN
HAMLET J. BARRY, Chairman

MINORITY REPORT
SPECIAL COMMITTEE-DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION
Elimination of Unnecessary Delay in Procedure

The undersigned member of the Committee approves the
majority report subject to the following suggestions:
Regarding the first recommendation-That all motions and demurrers
attacking or directed to any pleading be filed simultaneously:
It is suggested that the adoption of this recommendation might be
dangerous and is unnecessary, because:
a. Motions logically precede demurrers and it may be held that the
filing of a demurrer waives motions. If so, this change in the rule would
require a party to waive either the right to move (by filing a demurrer) or
the right to demur (by filing a motion without a demurrer). See Bollen vs.
Woodhams, 68 Colo. 322, 49 C. J. 760 Sec. 1081.
b. Both motions and demurrers have a proper and important office.
Their importance should not be disregarded or their proper use hampered or
endangered for the sake of speed.
c. The adoption of the recommended Presiding Judge system will so
facilitate disposition of motions and demurrers that they will no longer be
effective as means of delay and their use for that purpose will cease, thus
eliminating the need for this recommendation.
Respectfully submitted,
CARLE WHITEHEAD,
Minority Member.

OLD AGE FUND
UBSCRIBERS to the Old Age Fund will be interested
in knowing that the plan has met with general approval.
A substantial sum is now in the bank to the credit of
the Colorado Bar Association.
Any lawyer past 65 years of age, having practiced in the
State twenty years and finding himself in need, is eligible for
relief. In proper cases a pension of not more than $50.00
per month may be paid.
Subscriptions have arrived from all sections of the State.
Lawyers in distant and sparsely settled counties join with
their brethren of the cities in building up the Fund. The
widow of a distinguished attorney expresses her sympathy in
the form of a liberal check.
The Fund was created by the Colorado Bar Association
and will be administered by a Board of Trustees appointed by
that body, the present Board consisting of Edward Ring,
Henry H. Clark and Ernest L. Rhoads. Any Colorado
Lawyer, however, may apply for aid regardless of his affiliation, or lack of affiliation, with the Association. Subscriptions of $1.00 or more are therefore welcome from any lawyer
practicing in the State.
The starting of the Fund is regarded as timely in view
of the failure of the State law for old age pensions, a failure
apparently chargeable to our small-fry politicians.
Contributions may be sent to Ernest L. Rhoads, Treasurer, 1006 First National Bank Building, Denver.

ATTENTION!
ATTACHMENT CASE EXPERTS!

The following is a part of the traverse filed in an attachment suit:
"The defendants state

* * *

that they know of their own knowledge

that they contracted the debt on the express understanding and agreement that
the work would be done on credit and not for immediate payment, and pray
that the attachment be dissolved forthwith."

.+

Dictaphun ...

THOUSANDS LIKE THIS ARE ON FILE IN OUR
OFFICE
"Congratulations!

Dictaphun is 'The best legal humorous column pub(Signed) BENTLEY MCMULLIN.
You will be pleased to know that Mr. McMullin was not paid one
single dime for this testimonial. He has been a reader of Dictaphun for
one and one-half years. Before that he smoked another brand.

lished anywhere'."

ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS, INC.
The valued North Side Monitor's copy reader wrestles earnestly with
the problem of writing heads to announce the advent of Fairfield, Gould
and Woods. Witness (head on page one) :
"LEGAL COMPANY WINS OUTSTANDING HONORS.Firm of Fairfield, Gould and Woods Rated High in Denver Professional
Circles." And (head on page 5 continuing the good news) :
"LEGAL FRATERNITY WINS GREAT HONORS."

WHICH REMINDS US OF THIS ONE
The equally valued Congressional Record immortally embalms these
bitter words of Representative Wood (Rep.) of Indiana:
"It is too easy for gentlemen, with utter disregard of the truth, with
utter disregard of the situation, with utter disregard of the effect their blackened speeches may have, to get up on this floor and attack the character of
men who have no chance to be heard. I say this is all wrong and ought to
be condemned by all right-thinking men."

THIS COMES UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
TO THE CONSTITUTION
The same valuable family journal (Congressional Record to you) sets
forth how statesmen and potential presidents occupy their time, and that of
the Government Printing Office:
"MR. JOHNSON, of California, presented a memorial of sundry citizens of Camino and Placerville, Calif., remonstrating against the passage

of legislation providing for the dosing of barber shops on Sunday in the District of Columbia."
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IN THOSE DAYS THEY CALLED THEM PANICS
From literature distributed in behalf of a candidate for the United
States Senate at the ensuing hustings, we seize upon this gem:
"He returned to Colorado, opened a law office in
, and engaged
in mining."

AT FIRST BLUSH THIS WOULD APPEAR TO BE
VICARIOUS
The esteemed New York Times chronicles what happened in Hill v.
Hill, before Mr. Justice Hendrick of the Supreme Court as follows:
"An absolute divorce was granted to Mrs. Ora Manning Hill from her
husband, Dudley S. Hill, son of Dr. Charles G. Hill, on the grounds of the
latter's marital infidelity."

ON THE RIGHTS OF DOGS IN GEORGIA
We are indebted to Dayton Denious, Esq., for citation to Montgomery
v. Maryland Casualty Company, 169 Ga. 746. Certain of the syllabi, which
we quote, furnish but a clue to the wondrous delights of the opinion as a
whole. Q. v. it.
"Under the law and the evidence of this case, the dog was not a part of
the watchman's equipment . . ."
"The dog can not legally be classified as a fellow workman . .
"The act of the watchman in attempting to rescue the dog, which had
fallen into the river, was not an emergency . . . within the scope of the employment."

THE DOG RULE IN NEW YORK SEEMS CONTRA
In Wiley v. Slater, 22 Barb. 508, the Court confesses: "This is the
first time I have been called upon to administer the law in the case of a pure dog
fight, or a fight in which the dogs, instead of the owners, were the principal
actors. . . .The branch of the law applicable to direct conflicts between dog
and dog is entirely new to me .... I am constrained to admit total ignorance
of the code duello among dogs, or what constitutes a just cause of offense and
justifies a resort to the ultima ratio regem . .. ; whether jealousy is a just
cause of war, or what difference degrees and kinds of insult or slight, or
what violation of the rules of etiquette entitle the injured or offended beast
to insist upon prompt and appropriate satisfaction, I know not. . . . It is not
claimed upon either side that the struggle was not in all respects dog-like and
fair.... (I conclude) that this was one of the few privileges which this class
of animals still retained when they entered into and became a part of the
domestic institution, to settle and avenge, in their own way, all individual
wrongs and insults, without regard to what Blackstone or any other jurist
might write, think or speak. ..."
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BOOKS RECEIVED
AT THE SUPREME COURT LIBRARY
The following important early Mining Laws were presented to the library
by Mr. F. L. Collom, Attorney at Law, Idaho Springs, Colorado:
Laws of Lincoln District, Adopted at a meeting of the citizens of said
District, held at Glenard City, November 3, 1860. (News Printing
Company, Denver, 1860)
Revised Laws of Spanish Bar District, Idaho Territory, Adopted by the
Miners, January 22, 1861. (Daily Mountaineer Book and Job Office,
City of Denver, 1861)
The library has also acquired by purchase:
The Laws and Regulations of Union District, C. T., Passed October
21, 1861. (Collier & Wells, Printers, Register Office, Central, C. T.
1864)
Presented to the library by Mr. Joshua Grozier; Attorney at Law, Denver:
The Works of the Honourable James Wilson, late one of the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and Professor of
Law in the College of Philadelphia. Published under the direction of
Bird Wilson, Esquire. 1804. 2 vols.
Memoir of Theophilus Parsons, Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, with notices of some of his contemporaries. By
his son, Theophilus Parsons. 1859. 1 vol.
The Life and Times of John Dickinson, 1732-1808. Prepared at the
request of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, by Charles J. Stille.
1891. 1 vol.
A Great Peace Maker, The Diary of James Gallatin, Secretary to Albert
Gallatin, with an introduction by Vicount Bryce. 1914. 1 vol.

NEW BOOKS
Martindale-Hubbell Legal Directory, 1932. 2 vols.
Corporation Manual, 1932. John S. Parker, editor.
The law of Workman's Compensation, by William R. Schneider, 2nd Ed.
1932. 2 vols.
The law of Torts. Thomas M. Cooley, revised by Avery Haggard. 4th
Ed. 1932.
Trial Tactics, by Asher L. Cornelius. 1932.
The law of Advertising, by Clowry Chapman. 1929.
Progress of the law in the U. S. Supreme Court. A review of the work of
the Court beginning at the October term, 1928, to the October term,
1931. 3 vols.
Elements of Law, Natural and Politic. By Thomas Hobbes. 1930.
Stare Decisis, Res Judicata, and other selected essays. By Robert von
Moschzisker.
Banks and Banking. By Editorial Staff, Michie Publishing Co. Permanent
Edition. 1932.

(EniroR's NoTE.-It is intended

to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the

Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)
TRESPASS-SHEEP -MEASURE

OF DAMAGES -EXEMPLARY

DAMAGES-

Bullerdick vs. Pritchard- No. 12977Decided February 8, 1932Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Where the evidence is conflicting but the actual trespass and damage
is clearly supported by the evidence, the verdict will not be disturbed.
2. Where the damages were caused by defendant wrongfully pasturing
his sheep on plaintiff's land and rendering it worthless to plaintiff as pasture
for plaintiff's sheep and plaintiff was unable to secure other pasture, his
damages are not limited merely to the rental value. He is entitled to such
damages as will reasonably compensate him for all the loss he has sustained
taking into consideration the value of the pasture to plaintiff, the purpose for
which it was intended, the situation of plaintiff as a result of defendants acts
and the loss in weight and value of the sheep at market time on account of
lack of pasture.
3. Exemplary damages were justified.
The evidence showed a
deliberate purpose on defendants part to destroy his pasture and injure his
sheep.-Judgment affirmed.
EDiToR's NOTE: This case is highly interesting on the weight of precedents. To
sustain the judgment, counsel cited Blackstone and Exodus 22:5. The Court pertinently
asks why such modern authority is relied on when the rule is sustained by Code of
Hammurabi, sec. 57, 58, enacted about 2250 B.C.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-DISCONNECTION OF FARM LAND FROM CORPORATE LIMITS--Reichelt vs. Town of Julesburg-No. 12340--Decided
93 2

February 8, 1
-Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
1. In a proceedings under the statute to have lands disconnected from
the corporate limits of a town, it is essential that such lands be proven to be
agricultural or farm lands.
2. Where several owners of farms lands join in a petition to disconnect
such lands from corporate town limits, it is not necessary that each of such
tracts be contiguous to or upon the border of the town. If such tracts are
contiguous to each other and one of the tracts is on the border, it brings the
case within the statute.
3. The trial court erred in denying the petition on the ground that the
town had improved the highways passing through and adjoining the tracts by
construction of special improvements along over and under same such as electric current and water. The act of 1925 liberalized the conditions of release

175

DICTA

from the corporate limits by placing further limitations upon the defenses to
towns in proceedings to disconnect territory.
4. A transmission line for electric current rather imposes a servitude
on the highway instead of being a special improvement.
5. Objection to jurisdiction of County Court on ground that the lands
sought to be disconnected were worth more than $2000 and therefore outside
the jurisdiction of the court is not tenable. This is a special proceeding and
special statutory authority was conferred on the County Court in such cases.
This class of cases has nothing to do with title to lands and is not dependent
upon their value.
6. Such proceedings are not special or class legislation.-Judgment reversed.
Mr. Justice Hilliard dissents.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF-PAYMENT-SUFFICIENCY OF PLEA-People vs.

Miller-No. 12574-Decided February 8, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Butler.
1. Where the State brought suit to recover a gasoline excise tax after
the expiration of six years and the defendant pleaded the six year statute of
limitations such plea was not good. Such limitation statute does not run
against the State, unless the statute expressly so provides.
2. Where defendant pleads payments by averring that "if any sum
of money was ever due plaintiff that defendant had paid it prior to the institution of the suit" such plea being hypothetical was bad and the demurrer
should have been sustained.-Judgment reversed.

APPEAL AND ERROR-EFFECT OF LOWER COURT'S DECISION WHEN APPELLATE COURT IS EQUALLY DIviDEI>--Craddock vs. Graddock-No.

12720-Decided February 15, 1932-En Banc-Per Curiam.
1. Where in appellate proceedings one of the justices of the Supreme
Court does not participate in the hearing or in the consideration of the cause,
and the remaining six judges are equally divided, three being of the opinion
that the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed and three being of
the opinion that it should be reversed, the judgment of the lower court will
be affirmed by operation of law.-Judgment affirmed.

DIVORCE-EFFECT OF ENTRY OF FINAL DECREE ON MOTION OF GUILTY
PARTY-POWER OF COURT TO MODIFY ALIMONY AND

FOR MINOR CHILDREN-Kastner vs.

SUPPORT

MONEY

Kastner-No. 12478-Decided February 15, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Alter.
1. An entry of a final decree of divorce made and entered at the
request and upon the motion of the guilty party to a divorce action, is void
and any attempted modification thereof is a nullity.
2. However, where the parties to a divorce action enter into a con-
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tract for a property and financial settlement between them and said contract
is approved by the District Court in the findings of fact and conclusions of
law, but said contract was not filed in court nor made a part of the findings
of fact and conclusions of law, the mere approval of the court did not operate
to make the independent contract of the parties a part of or enforcible as a
preliminary or final decree.
3. When both parties, after the entry of the preliminary decree voluntarily appeared and submitted the question of alimony and support money
constituted the first request and the court's first opportunity to determine this
question, and therefore the court had power to enter an order with reference
to same, and the mere fact that the order was entitled "Modified Decree" was
wholly immnaterial.-Judgmentaffirmed in part and reversed in part.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-ORAL SALE OF GOODS-VALIDITY OF-Saliba vs.

The
Reed Electric Co.-No. 12995-Decided February 15, 1932-Opinion by
Mr. Justice Alter.
1. An oral agreement by one to construct an article particularly for
and according to the plans of another, whether at an agreed price or not,
although the transaction is to result in a sale of the article, is a contract for
work and labor. In such case, the contract is for the manufacture and sale of
a thing made to suit the fancy and serve the particular convenience and
purpose of the defendant, without a market value for use in general trade, and
therefore, although the agreement might result in the productions and sale
of a chattel, is one for work and labor and is not within the Statute of Frauds.
2. When the subject matter of the oral contract is an article which is
such as the seller usually carries as a part of his stock in trade, as distinguished
from one to be manufactured for special use and according to a particular
plan and design, such contract comes within the Statute of Frauds.-Judgment
reversed.
JUDGMENTS-MODIFICATION

OF

JUDGMENT

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES-Osborne

AT SUBSEQUENT TERMv. MacDonald-No. 13036-

Decided February 15, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
1. Ordinarily a court cannot in the absence of a permissive statute set
aside or modify its judgment upon application made after the expiration of
the term.
2. The exceptions to this rule are where a judgment is entered without jurisdiction of the defendant or where there has been a clerical mistake in
the entry of the judgment of the court or where a judgment debtor, through
no fault of his own, fails to get before the reviewing court a bill of exceptions necessary to a review of the errors assigned by him.
3. In an action founded upon tort, where the jury found that in committing the tort complained of defendant is guilty of fraud and wilful deceit
and defendant was committed to jail for a term of six months and where
more than one year after such judgment was entered the court modified the
judgment by reducing the defendant's confinement from six months to 110
days, the court was without power to so modify the judgment. The applica-
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tion for such modification not being made under Section 81 of the Code, as
having been taken through mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.
-Judgment reversed.
APPEAL AND ERROR-EFFECT OF LOWER COURT'S DECISION WHEN APPELLATE COURT IS EQUALLY DIvIDED-LaArgo vs. Cronbaugh, et al.-No.

12870-Decided February 15, 1932-En Banc-Per Curiam.
1. Where in appellate proceedings one of the justices of the Supreme
Court does not participate in the hearing or in the consideration of the cause,
and the remaining six judges are equally divided, three being of the opinion
that the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed and three being of
the opinion that it should be reversed, the judgment of the lower court will
be affirmed by operation of law.-Judgment affirmed.
JUDGMENTS-FINALITY oF-DISMISSAL OF WRIT OF ERROR-Stuchlik vs.

Talpers-No. 12458-Decided February 15, 19 3 2 -Opinion
by Mr.
Justice Burke.
1. In an action for ejectment where the lower court made findings for
the plaintiff and judgment was entered for possession by the plaintiff and
immediately thereafter the plaintiff requested a hearing on the question of
damages for the use of the land and the court continued the hearing on the
question of damages to a later date, and the record is silent as to how the
question of damages was disposed of, there was no such final judgment from
which a writ of error could be prosecuted; and the writ should therefore be
dismissed.
2. Writ dismissed.
NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENTS -

COGNOVIT

NOTES -

JUDGMENTS

ON -

SET

EVIDENCE-Denver Industrial Corporation vs. Kesselring et al.-No. 12413-Decided February 23, 1932Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
ASIDE WHEN-EvIDENCE-PAROLE

I.
Where a plaintiff took judgment without service of process pursuant
to its rights under a cognovit note, defendant may thereafter file an affidavit
of a meritorious defense and, if filed within a reasonable time, the judgment
may be set aside and the defendant given leave to plead.
II.
Where defendant has purchased stock in the plaintiff's corporation and
has later deposited that stock with the plaintiff as security for a loan, evidence,
to the effect that the plaintiff agreed to sell defendant's stock at any time that
the defendant should request it to do so and that defendant did request plaintiff to sell the stock which was of greater value than the note which plaintiff
sued upon, is admissable. It is not parole evidence attempting to vary the
terms of a written contract but was the statement of an agreement between
plaintiff and defendant, obligatory upon the plaintiff. Such evidence does not
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tend to dispute the validity of the note in question but merely advances
another agreement not in conflict with the note.
III.
An agreement by the seller of stock to resell is properly the subject of
a contract and, even though not embodied in the written instrument, is
capable of enforcement.-Judgment affirmed.
REAL PROPERTY - LEASES - FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER IMPLIED
WARRANTIEs-A DEFENSE TO-WHEN-Martin vs. Grant-No. 12510

-Decided

February23, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.

I.
When the plaintiff in a forcible entry and detainer suit has agreed, in
the lease, to permit the defendant lessee to use the water pumping plant on
the premises, providing that the lessee shall pay for all costs of its operation,
there is no warranty, express or implied, that the pumping plant is in condition for immediate use. Even though such a warranty could be deemed to
exist, the failure on the part of the lessee to have the plant repaired for more
than two months, resulting in the ruination of his crop, would preclude him
from asserting such implied warranty as a defense.-Judgment affirmed.
OF-Fangman et al
Decided February 23, 1932-Opinion by
I.

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICT-MINORs--RESIDENCE

vs. Moyers et al-No. 13028Mr. Justice Burke.

The residence of a child may be other than that of its parents or
guardian.
II.
Where a child resides with the family and pays for his upkeep partially
by work and partially by moneys received from his father and where the
father has placed the minor with the family to give him a proper home influence, the residence of the child for the purposes of determining his right to
schooling is with the family and not his father.

III.
Where the statute provides that the residence of an unmarried person
of school age shall, in all cases, be held to be identical with the bona fide
residence of the parent or guardian, this statute is merely intended as a guide
in making up the required census and does not pertain to residence in "as
applied to school privileges."-Judgment affirmed.
LIFE INSURANCE-CANCELLING.
FICIARY-EFFECT OF-Hill vs.

POLICY WITHOUT

CONSENT

OF

BENE-

Capitol Life Insurance Co.-No. 12445-

Decided February 29, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.

1. Where insured gives his note for first year premium on life insurance policy and by agreement between insured and insurer, his note was not
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paid but was cancelled and returned in consideration of cancellation of insurance policy, such cancellation of policy is ineffective as to rights of beneficiary,
when beneficiary does not consent to such cancellation.
2. This is true even where policy reserves right in insured to change
beneficiary.
3. In such case, the beneficiary named had a vested interest therein.
-Judgment reversed.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW -

CRIMINAL

LAW -

INSPECTION

OF

MELONS -

INVALIDITY OF ACT-People vs. Stanley-No. 12627-Decided February
29, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Alter.
1. A statute, prohibiting any person from selling, shipping, or offering
for sale or shipment, or placing upon the market any cantaloupes or melons
unless the same are first inspected and certified by State Inspector as to
maturity and fitness of condition for shipment, is unconstitutional, where it
provides no definite rules, regulations, specifications, classifications or standards for determining such maturity and fitness of condition.
2. In such case, such statute reposes in the inspector absolute and
arbitrary power to certify or not and is violation of the due process of law
and equal rights provisions of both the United States and Colorado constitutions.-Judgment affirmed.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-LIEN

FOR WATER ASSESSMENTS-PRIORITY-

DEMURRER-Town of Ordway vs. Kaiser-No. 12567-DecidedFebruary
29, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. In an action by a town to collect water assessments, and to have
judgment declared a lien upon real estate of defendant, a complaint is fatally
defective where it fails to set forth facts showing priority of its lien.
2. Where it appears that the town is seeking to have water assessments
declared a lien against real estate, it cannot claim a lien for water furnished
prior to a time it alleges there was any ordinance in effect creating such lien.
3. A lien for water furnished is junior to a lien of a deed of trust,
unless created before the recording of the deed of trust.-Judgment affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DISCRETION OF INDUSTRIAL COWMISSION TO
RE-OPEN AND RECONSIDER CLAIM-FINALITY OF CLAIM-Industrial

Commission vs. Lockard-No. 13016-Decided February 29, 1932Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
1. Where the Industrial Commission refuses to re-open and reconsider
a claim upon the grounds that there was no error, mistake or change in conditions, the District Court is without power to order the Commission to make
findings of fact and conditions and circumstances which moved it to refuse to
re-open the case.
2. Where the Commission based its refusal upon the matters appearing in the record before it, and such record does not show that the action of
the commission was the result of fraud or a clear abuse of discretion, its
action should have been affirmed by the District Court.-Judgment reversed.
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DAMAGES-PERSONAL

INJURIES-NEGLIGENCE-MISCONDUCT-Averch

vs.

Johnston-No. 12946-Decided February 29, 1932-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Butler.
1. Where plaintiff was rightfully delivering coal to defendant's packing plant and was picking up coal that had fallen to ground while being
shovelled out of truck, adjoining a cattle chute, and defendant's servant in
trying to drive cows through chute, hurled a large stick at one of the cows,
which glanced off cow and struck plaintiff, injuring him, and when defendant's
servant knew of his presence there, the question of negligence was a question
for the jury.
2. In such case, a verdict for $2800.00 was not excessive.
3. Plaintiff was not a mere trespasser, even though at the time of the
injury he had finished unloading the coal, as his duty included picking up the
coal that had fallen to the ground.
4. Even though he had finished his work, and might be considered a
trespasser, this did not relieve the defendant from liability. If defendant knew
of his presence there, they owed him the duty of using reasonable care not to
injure him by any affirmative act.
5.

Improper statements by plaintiff's counsel in argument, cured by

Court at once instructing jury to disregard such statements.-Judgment
affirmed.
WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION-DEPENDENTS-RULE

FOR ESTABLISHING-

Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. vs. Industrial Commission-No. 12976-Decided February 29, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
1. The question of dependency must be determined as a matter of fact,
and cannot be based upon an existing legal duty to provide support.-Judg-

ment reversed.
EXECUTIONS-SALE OF EXEMPT PROPERTY-AUTOMOBILE USED IN BusiNESS AS EXEMPT-LIABILITY OF SHERIFF-Blum vs. Kasik-No. 13042-

Decided March 7,1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
1.

Where an automobile is seized by a sheriff under writ of execution

and judgment debtor files claim of exemption with the sheriff on the claim
that the automobile is exempt because used in his business, the sheriff is liable
for treble damages for selling same.
2. Where execution is issued by District Court of Denver County to
sheriff of Boulder County and that sheriff seizes an automobile and judgment
defendant files claim of exemption with the sheriff, and thereupon the District
Court of Denver County proceeds to a hearing without notice to judgment
defendant and denies his claim of exemption, such court is without jurisdiction
to enter such order.
3. The Colorado statute being silent as to how a claim of exemption
shall be determined, a judgment debtor claiming exemption of property seized
has two remedies. He can submit to the jurisdiction of the court out of which
the execution issued and ask that it determine his claim or he can notify the
sheriff in possession of the property claimed to be exempt of such claim and
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demand its return, and in the event of sale thereafter, pursue the remedy
provided by statute for such illegal sale.-Judgment affirmed.
BANKS AND BANKING--INSOLVENCY-COUNTY

FUNDS

NOT

PREFERRED--

Board of County Commissioners vs. McFerson-No. 12822-Decided
March 7, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Adams.
1. As applied to insolvent banks in which deposits of public money
have been made, the rule is that in the absence of a statute or a showing of
facts sufficient to create a trust, a claim for public money has no preference
over the claims of the general creditors of a bank, but stands on the same
footing with them.
2. In Colorado there is no statute that warrants such a preference.
3. The fact that the state holds insufficient security is inadequate to
justify a preference.
4. Neither is the fact that the county is in urgent need of the funds
so deposited of any weight.
5. There was no error in the judgment below in disallowing the claim
as a preferred claim without prejudice to its right to apply for the allowance
of its demand as a common claim.-Judgment affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-LOSS OF PARTS OF FOUR FINGERS-METHOD
OF COMPUTING COMPENSATION-Cresson Consolidated Gold Mining Co.

vs. The Industrial Commission-No. 12969-Decided March 7, 1932Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
1. Where injured employee is permanently disabled by loss of little
finger of left hand at proximal joint, index finger of right hand at distal
joint and middle and ring fingers of right hand at second joint, the industrial
Commission was in error in awarding him compensation under section 4452
C.L.1921 based upon a finding of 25% disability as a working unit.
2. In such case, the injuries sustained were specifically provided for
together with the rate of compensation by sec. 4447, C.L.1921 as amended,
which allows a specific number of weeks compensation for each of such injuries,
which when added together will give the total compensation to be awarded.
-Judgment reversed.
DEEDS-WARRANTY

DEED--RESERVATION OF LIFE ESTATE-WHETHER

WILL OR A DEED-PARTITION-Million

A

vs. Botefur-No. 12599-De-

cided March 7, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
1. Where, in an ordinary form of warranty deed containing the regular granting clause, there is added to the habendum clause, a reservation,
reserving in the grantor a life estate and providing that upon the death of the
grantor the fee simple title to vest in grantee, such instrument will not be
construed as a will.
2. Under such circumstances, the instrument was valid as a deed. It
conveyed a present interest in the property.
3. The granting clause controls over the clause containing the reserva-
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4. The apparent and reasonable construction to be applied to the terms
of the proviso is that the life estate reserved to the grantor terminated upon
her death leaving the fee simple title thereto vested in the grantee, free and
clear from any reserved interest.
5. Irrespective of the construction placed upon this proviso, the deed
having been delivered, it will be sustained as a present grant of a future
interest.-Judgment affirmed.
BLUE SKY ACT-WITHDRAWAL OF REFERENDUM PETITION DURING HEARING-EFFECT OF AS DISMISSAL OF ACTION-Robinson vs. Armstrong-

No. 13001-13002--Decided March 7, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Burke.
1. Where plaintiffs filed a petition to refer the Blue Sky Act to the
electorate and a protest was filed with secretary of state and protest sustained
and action was then brought in District Court to review such action, and
pending review, plaintiffs withdrew the petition, such withdrawal amounted
to a dismissal of the action and there is nothing before the court to review.
-Judgment

affirmed.

MORTGAGES-FORECLOSURE-RIGHTS OF SUBSEQUENT ENCUMBRANCEBailey vs.
REDEMPTIONMETHOD OF ASCERTAINING JUDGMENT-

Merritt-No. 12570-Decided March 7, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Butler.
1. Where defendant gave to plaintiff note secured by deed of trust
and thereafter plaintiff loaned additional money to defendant and to secure
the additional loan, conveyed the same real estate by warranty deed to plaintiff and upon default on first loan, plaintiff had the public trustee foreclose
and at the same time brought suit in the District Court to have the warranty
deed declared to be a mortgage and for judgment for the amount found to be
due and to foreclose the interest of defendant, and plaintiff at public trustees
sale purchased the property for the amount of the original loan and indebtedness secured thereby, and thereupon discovered that there were judgment
creditors and to avoid judgment creditors liens, plaintiff redeemed the
property as a subsequent encumbrancer, and received a certificate of redemption, the court below, in the suit to have the deed declared a mortgage erred
in decreeing that there must be a foreclosure of such deed decreed to a mortgage where plaintiff only was insisting upon a judgment and that the deed be
held to be a mortgage.
2. Under such circumstances the plaintiff could not be compelled to
proceed to a foreclosure of the mortgage deed.
3. Where the grantor fails to redeem, the subsequent encumbrancer
who redeems is entitled to a deed. This negatives the idea that the plaintiff
herein must proceed to a foreclosure of her mortgage.
4. Where the property is worth less than the amounts secured by both
the first and second encumbrances, plaintiff is entitled to have such value
ascertained by the court and credited upon the debt, less the amount paid by
plaintiff to redeem.-Judgment reversed.

DICTA

183

AUTOMOBILES COLLISION - RIGHT OF WAY CITY ORDINANCESDIRECTED VERDICT FOR PLAINTIFF-Englebright vs. Rowley-No. 12593

-Decided March 7, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
1. Where plaintiff's wife was driving an automobile south on Broadway in city of Pueblo, a double street with parkway in the middle, and made
a left hand turn and defendant's truck was coming north on the right hand
side of the parkway and was about 150 feet away from intersection just before
plaintiff's wife started to make a left hand turn and she did not again look to
the right and the collision occurred in the intersection, the lower court erred
in directing a verdict for plaintiff.
2. Under the Pueblo ordinance, which provides that of two vehicles
approaching an intersection, the one approaching from the right shall have the
right of way, therefore under the facts in this case, defendant's truck had the
right of way.-Judgment reversed.
CONDEMNATION-LANDS ABUTTING STREAM-WATER COURSES-INSTRUC-

TIONS-Heimbecher vs. Denver-No. 12620-Decided March 7, 1932Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
1. In a condemnation suit by a city against the owner of lots abutting
a non-navigable stream, where the owner adopts the theory in the court below
that his ownership of the lots is limited to the bank of the stream and does not
go to the thread of the stream, and the court below adopts the theory of the
owner and instructs the jury accordingly, such owner will not be permitted to
assail such instruction upon review.
2. Under such circumstances it is immaterial whether such instruction
is erroneous or not.-Judgment affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-JUVENILE DELINQUENCY-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCECONTINUANCE-MISCONDUCT RESPECTING JURY-Sharp vs. The People

No. 12986-Decided March 7, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Alter.
1. Evidence is sufficient to sustain charge of contributing to juvenile
delinquency where it shows that defendant, a married man, the father of
several children, induced a 15 year old girl to permit defendant to take picture
of her in the nude.
2. Where the jury found that defendant aided and encouraged the
taking of such pictures in the nude and that this act caused induced or caused
the girl to become immoral and to associate with immoral persons and to perform immoral acts, such findings were amply sufficient to sustain the charge.
3. Where the defendant requested a continuance after the trial had
started, the granting or denial of same rested in the sound discretion of the
court.
4. Where the officer in charge of the jury, permitted the jury to
separate in a restaurant and sit and converse with third parties, after the jury
had retired to deliberate upon its verdict, which fact was known to defendant
and he took no steps to call the officers attention thereto or take any steps to
prevent it, he cannot sit idly by and upon the return of an unfavorable verdict,
use this incident as an excuse to gain another trial.-Judgment affirmed.

DICTA
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-PRIORITY OF LIEN OVER EXECUTION-PURCHASE
PRICE MORTGAGE-Robinson vs. Wright-No. 12534-Decided March

14, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
1. At common law, an execution bound debtor's personal property
from the time it was awarded.
2. In Colorado, it only binds debtor's property from the time it is
delivered to the Sheriff.
3. A chattel mortgage given for purchase price of automobile and
mules is superior to lien of execution, although executed and recorded after
execution is delivered to Sheriff and recorded in Sheriff's book.-udgment
affirmed.
SHERIFF-CASH

BOND-EFFECT OF ON RIGHTS OF PARTY FURNISHING

BoN--Lowrie vs. Harvey-No. 12625-Decided March 14, 1932Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
1. A complaint alleging that plaintiff deposited with Sheriff a Liberty
Bond for $1,000.00 to secure appearance of one Dobson in a criminal case and
that Dobson appeared and bondsman was discharged; whereupon one Gibbons,
who had filed criminal complaint obtained a civil judgment for the amount
involved in criminal action, and had Sheriff levy on the Liberty Bond with
full knowledge of plaintiff's ownership of Liberty Bond, and alleging ownership in plaintiff, denying ownership in Dobson, demand for possession and
refusal of Sheriff to return, states a good cause of action, and it was error for
lower court to sustain a demurrer for want of facts.
2. Assuming, but not deciding, that the Sheriff had no power to accept
such cash bond in lieu of the appearance bond, required by statute, he held
himself out as having power to accept it, and the plaintiff having deposited it
in good faith, was entitled to have it returned.
3. It would be a travesty on justice to hold that because plaintiff
participates in a technical violation of the Statute defining the kind of a bond
to be given, that he would lose his security and the process of the court cannot
be used to permit the property of a bondsman to be appropriated by a judgment
creditor in such a case.-Judgment reversed.
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